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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Europe After 1992: The Legal Challenge
Francis G. Jacobst

It is a great pleasure for me to give this address, on an occasion which expresses dramatically the great American interest regarding European Community ("EC" or "Community") developments. I think it best to concentrate mainly on the themes of the
three panel discussions, advancing some views of my own but not
in any way preempting those discussions. Accordingly, I shall consider issues of competition and antitrust, the environment, and the
role of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). I will try to raise
some broader questions about the ,future of the ECJ's role and,
thus, about the future of the Community itself.
In the course of this introduction, I shall mention some points
of comparison between the situation in the European Community
and in the United States. However, such comparisons are inherently difficult, indeed dangerous, and the points of difference are
often more significant than the similarities. There is in fact structurally little in common, at least as yet, between a federal system
of the type exemplified by the United States and the European
model. The recent debate in Europe on the use of the term "federal" seems to me to miss the point. For example, a federal system
t Advocate General, Court of Justice of the European Communities.
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such as that in the United States implies a certain degree of stability, in which the division of the powers between the central authority and the component States is reasonably settled. The Community system, by contrast, is an evolutionary one, although the great
difficulties of the process necessarily render that evolution spasmodic. Moreover, the Community is evolving on two different
planes, as the Community both enlarges progressively and develops
policies internally. While a contrast is often drawn between the
processes of enlargement and what is sometimes called "deepening," the distinction is not straightforward. In fact, the two1
processes interact: for example, the Internal Market Programme
introduced under the Single European Act ("SEA") appears to
have intensified the interest of many European states in joining
the Community.
The institutions and membership of the Community have developed in several stages, beginning with the six countries of the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty") then
extended the Coal and Steel Community's activities to the economy at large in 1957, and the EEC Treaty remains the basic charter of the Community. The 1960s and 1970s were a quiescent period, during which the basic legal doctrines of the Community were
developed, most notably the fundamental principle of the direct
effect of Community law.2 The Community was enlarged in 1973 to
include Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.' Significant
institutional developments took place at the end of the 1970s, with
4
the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament
and the introduction of the European Monetary System.' The
Community was enlarged further in 1981 and 1986 to include first
Greece,6 then Spain and Portugal.7 Also in the 1980s, the grand
design of the European Parliament led to the draft Treaty on EuTreaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Art 8A (as amended by the Single European Act
("SEA"), Art 13 (1987)).
2 Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-enExpeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos
v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration) ("Van Gend en Loos"), 1963 ECR 1, 1963 CMLR 105.
8 Treaty of Accession, January 22, 1972.
4 Council Dec 76/787, 1976 OJ L278:5 (concerning the election of representatives of the
Assembly by direct universal suffrage).
Resolution of March 22, 1971 (concerning the attainment by stages of economic and
monetary unity in the Community).
6 Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic.
7 Treaty of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic.
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ropean Union, adopted in February 1984.8 In 1986 and 1987, the
Member States responded by adopting the SEA,9 the first significant reshaping of the Community Treaties since their origin.
While providing for the completion of the internal market by
the end of 1992, the SEA also included provisions for new or additional, Community policies in the fields of monetary policy, social
policy, social and economic cohesion, research and technology, and
the environment. 10 The SEA also significantly facilitated legislative
action by replacing the requirement of unanimity in the Council of
Ministers with majority voting in certain areas1 1 and granting the
European Parliament certain powers of co-decision with the Council.1" Moreover, the SEA introduced a new cooperative procedure
between the Council and the European Parliament, strengthening
the Parliament's previously purely consultative role.13
Recently, Member State leaders agreed to far-reaching amendments to the Community structure at the Conference on Political
Union and the Conference on Economic and Monetary Union held
in Maastricht, Netherlands in December 1991.14 The resulting
Treaty on European Union, if ratified by the Member States, will
establish a European Union founded on the European Communities and based on the acquis communautaire, the Community's
heritage. The draft Treaty also covers, among other things, implementation of a common foreign and security policy, cooperation in
the spheres of justice and home affairs, and adoption of a single
currency. Of these initiatives, the creation of a unified currency
would transform the Community more fundamentally than any
other into a genuine Union. Finally, the Maastricht Treaty will
amend the EEC Treaty by introducing changes in legislative procedure as 15well as new provisions relating to several Community
policies.

' Resolution on the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1984 OJ C77:33.
9 SEA.
'0 Id, Arts 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25 respectively.
" See, for example, id, Art 18.
"2Id, Arts 8 and 9.

" SEA, Art 6.
" The resulting Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht on February 7,
1992, 31 ILM 247 (1992).
1" See Treaty on European Union, draft Articles 189A, 189B, and 189C, and the new
Part Three, respectively, 31 ILM at 296-98.
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COMPETITION LAW

Against this broadly sketched background, let me turn now to
the subject of competition and antitrust. A comparison of EC and
U.S. enforcement schemes casts a good deal of light on the differences in the rules themselves and in the policy goals which underlie those rules.
Enforcement of the competition rules in the European Community is still largely centralized, unlike the United States. When
enforcing competition law, the European Commission performs the
functions of several discrete U.S. agencies, including the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission. The European
Commission's various roles include studying and investigating different sectors of the economy, formulating competition policy, ini-

tiating legislation, and adopting implementing legislation. Additionally, the Commission makes formal decisions through a
procedure which combines the roles of prosecutor, investigator,
judge, and executioner. Finally, the Commission presides over informal adjudications or settlements.
The centrality of the Commission's role is underscored by the
procedure of notification and exemption under Article 85(3) of the
EEC Treaty. Through this system, which has no analogue in the
United States, the Commission keeps itself informed of agreements
and practices throughout the Community and plays a central role
in granting or refusing exemptions from the competition rules
under Article 85(1).
Similarly, the role of the ECJ also reflects the centralized implementation of the competition rules. Although the recently established Court of First Instance16 has already contributed substantially to the review of Commission decisions, two factors have
preserved centralized administration of Community competition
law. First, the Court of First Instance and, on appeal, the ECJ
have exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commission.
Second, Article 177 of the EEC Treaty gives the ECJ a central role
in cases referred from national courts applying the competition
rules.

17

Finally, in contrast with the practice in the United States, enforcement actions are rarely brought by way of private litigation in
the national courts. Even when such suits are brought, the ECJ
retains the right to issue preliminary rulings for national courts.
16Authorized

by EEC, Art 168A (as amended by SEA, Art 11).
" EEC, Art 177.
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Courts of last resort in the Member States are obliged to refer all
questions of interpretation of the competition rules, as with all
other questions of Community law, to the ECJ. 18
The relative novelty of the Community system provides a partial explanation for this remarkable degree of centralization in enforcement. As the Community continues to evolve, enforcement
undoubtedly will become less centralized. There are, however,
other reasons in the Community system which may justify maintaining a more centralized enforcement scheme: 1) from a legal
perspective, the need for uniform application of the law; 2) from
an economic perspective, the objective of securing equal conditions
of competition throughout the Community (the so-called "level
playing field"); and 3) the requirements of the Internal Market.
The centralization of enforcement in the Community has profoundly influenced the policy goals of antitrust law. In the first
place, those goals are easier to define, especially given the Commission and the ECJ's acceptance of market integration as a general
goal of the competition rules. Furthermore, the Commission and
the ECJ both recognize that competition rules function as a counterpart to the elimination of national barriers to the free movement of goods. Therefore, the competition rules supplement EEC
Treaty rules on the free movement of goods.
The emphasis on market integration and on the elimination of
trade barriers between Member States could displace even purely
competitive considerations. Both export bans between Member
States and measures designed to discourage parallel imports have
been treated severely, even though parallel imports may make little sense from a strictly economic viewpoint. Consider, also, vertical restraints: in contrast to the rule of reason analysis that characterizes U.S. antitrust jurisprudence, 9 exclusive territorial
agreements using Member State boundaries often have been
viewed as impermissible, with little or no analysis of their anticompetitive effects. On the other hand, horizontal restraints have been
viewed with some indulgence in the Community, especially those
involving firms from different Member States. Joint ventures and
specialization agreements which might not be permitted in the
United States have been approved in the Community, on the basis
that such agreements are likely to encourage cooperation and integration among firms across Member State boundaries.

18Id.
'9 Continental T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 US 36 (1977).
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However, this emphasis on integration may well change as a
result of the Single Market itself. The elimination of barriers between Member States may reduce the need to emphasize the integrationist goals of Community competition law, and the emergence
of normal market conditions throughout the Community may
make the U.S. experience more directly relevant. In that event, the
evolution of Community competition law might mirror more
closely developments in U.S. antitrust law. Corporations operating
in different jurisdictions, for example, might welcome the possibility of greater convergence. At present, corporations face conflicting, sometimes irreconcilable, requirements. To take perhaps an
extreme example, a pricing requirement imposed in one jurisdiction might result in price discrimination prohibited by another
jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the United States and the European Community
might achieve some formal harmonization of antitrust policy.
While informal cooperation has existed for many years, the European Commission recently concluded an agreement with the U.S.
authorities-an agreement which France has now challenged in the
ECJ. Practical cooperation between the enforcement authorities on
both sides of the Atlantic will no doubt continue.
A favorite topic in antitrust enforcement is, of course, the private antitrust action. Here there is a familiar irony: within the
Community, there is much interest in the development of private
enforcement; however, this interest has never really taken root, despite the Commission's encouragement. On the other hand, private
enforcement faces increasing criticism in the U.S. due to its enormous expense, sometimes vexatious aspects, and, especially given
the vagaries of the jury system, unpredictability. The fact that
Americans are unable to understand why Europeans are content to
rely almost exclusively on a system of public regulation, while
Europeans, by contrast, delight in telling stories of what they regard as the improbable extremes of American litigation suggests a
serious cultural gap.
On a more serious note, differences in the role of the public
sector account for a large gap between the U.S. and the European
experience. Despite recent trends in privatization, a substantial
proportion of the European economy remains in the hands of either the public sector or licensed monopolies. An interesting development in ECJ case law concerns the possible application of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits abuse of a dominant
position, to the public and licensed monopoly sectors. In one re-
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cent case, arrangements outlawing private head-hunting agencies
in Germany were held unlawful under Article 86.20
Similarly, much of the enforcement effort in Europe is concerned with policing state subsidies to industry, which have no immediate counterpart in the U.S. The coexistence of public and private activities requires stringent constraints in the field of public
subsidy. Indeed, the European Commission has increasingly focused on more rigorous enforcement of the Treaty provisions on
State aid. 21 The Commission's powers in this field have been the
subject of much recent litigation, in which the ECJ has recognized
the importance of making the Commission's powers more effective.22 The advent of the Single Market will inevitably emphasize
the need to monitor state aid, and attention will focus increasingly
on issues such as the transparency of the Member States' financial
involvement in the public sector of their economies.
This brief survey leads me to Suggest that there may be three
particular developments in the competition field. First, the application of the competition rules will increasingly emphasize competition itself, rather than market integration. Second, enforcement
of the competition laws is likely to become decentralized in certain
sectois, although areas having a truly Community dimension, such
as merger control, may be expected to remain centralized. Finally,
there will probably be a move toward more equal treatment of the
public and the private sectors.

II.

ENVIRONMENT

I now turn to the subject of the environment. I note first that
it is an excellent idea on the part of the organizers of this gathering to have chosen to address environmental issues. Although
Community environmental law is still in its infancy, environmental
issues are certain to play. a leading role in the developments of the
next decade.
I say that the subject is still in its infancy in Community law
because, in part, there was no place for environmental concerns in
the EEC Treaty as originally drafted. However, in the 1970s, a far-

20

Case C-41/90, Hbfner v Macrotron GmbH, 1991 ECR 1-1979.

"' Commission of the European Communities, XXth Report on ComIretition Policy
169 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 1991).
" See, for example, Case C-142/87, Re Tubemeuse: Belgium v Commission, 1991:3
CMLR 213 (1990).
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reaching program of legislation's was initiated on the basis of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. Article 235 enables the Council, acting
unanimously, to act in cases where Community measures "prove
necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common
market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty
has not provided the necessary powers. ' 24 Reliance on Article 235,
however, was not without its difficulties. First, the Community
could act only by unanimous agreement of the twelve Member
States. Second, every Community initiative had to be shown to be
necessary to attain one of the Community's objectives. Third, the
Treaty itself offered no guidance as to the purposes of Community
action in the environmental field.
The situation was to some extent remedied by the Single European Act. The SEA devoted specific attention to the environment in a new Title VII headed "Environment," and set forth the
environmental objectives of the Community in a new Article 130R.
These objectives are:
(1) to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the
environment;
(2) to contribute towards protecting human health;
(3) to ensure a prudent and rational utilization of natu2 5
ral resources.
Paragraph 2 of Article 130R further provided that:
Action by the Community relating to the environment
shall be based on the principles that preventive action
should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a
priority, be rectified at source, and that the polluter
should pay. Environmental protection requirements shall
be a component of the Community's other policies.26
Paragraph 4 of Article 130R added the qualification that the
Community should only take action relating to the environment
when measures at the Community level, rather than at the level of
the individual Member States, would better achieve those environmental objectives.2 7 This qualification constituted a specific refer23 See Ludwig Kramer, EEC Treaty and Environmental Protection ch 1 (Sweet &
Maxwell, 1990).
24 EEC, Art 235.
'6 EEC, Art 130R(1) (as amended by SEA, Art 25).
2 EEC, Art 130R(2) (as amended by SEA, Art 25). This language was particularly important in relation to the much maligned common agricultural policy.
27 EEC, Art 130R(4) (as amended by SEA, Art 25).
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ence to the new doctrine (new at least in terms of express recognition) of subsidiarity.
However, the SEA did not wholly remove the difficulties facing environmental legislation, as there still was no agreement on
moving away from the unanimity requirement towards decision by
qualified majority. Article 130S introduced a compromise: the
Council acting unanimously should decide what action was to be
taken by the Community; but the Council might also define, again
on the basis of unanimity, those matters on which decisions were
to be taken by qualified majority."
Article 130T acknowledged the fact that environmental standards differed significantly among the Member States 29 and, therefore, provided that any protective measures adopted in common,
pursuant to Article 130S, should not prevent any Member State
from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with the Treaty.3 0
As the EEC Treaty has evolved to address environmental concerns, the ECJ also has faced a number of environmental issues.
The court has had to address questions concerning the potential
conflict between the Treaty provisions on the free movement of
goods and the needs of environmental protection,"1 questions involving the legal basis of Community environmental measures, and
disputes concerning the role of the ECJ in proceedings brought
against Member States for failure to comply with obligations arising under environmental directives.
The impact of the free movement of goods on the environment
has raised some difficult questions for the ECJ, primarily because
the free movement of goods represents the cornerstone of the common market. Accordingly, the ECJ has narrowly interpreted those
exceptions to the free movement of goods allowed under Article 36
of the Treaty. For instance, in some cases, the "human health" ex32
ception may permit restrictions where there is a danger to health.
In contrast, where the danger is rather to "the quality of life," an

28

EEC, Art 130S (as amended by SEA, Art 25).

' EEC, Art 130T.
30 Substantial amendments to the EEC Treaty were implemented
by the Treaty on
European Union. Time and space scarcely permit a full account of the amendments. See
Treaty on European Union, Arts 130R, 130S, and 130T. 31 ILM 247 (1992).
" The leading case on this question is the Danish case on non-returnable bottles. Case
302/86, Re Disposable Beer Cans: Commission v Denmark, 1988 ECR 4607, 1989:1 CMLR
619.
" See EEC, Art 36.
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expansive interpretation seems excluded." However, the ECJ has
developed a doctrine outside Article 36 of the Treaty permitting
certain exceptions to the free movement of goods which are neces' In Commission v Densary to serve "mandatory requirements." 34
3
5
mark, the Danish bottle case, those requirements were held to
include environmental protection. Those exceptions may be invoked, however, only for non-discriminatory measures.3 6
The difficulty then is that free trade may override sensitive
environmental measures, a difficulty reflected in the current debate
in the United States over the GATT negotiations. I note, for example, a resolution recently considered by the U.S. House of Representatives expressing the fear that "national sovereignty to set domestic environmental, health, safety and labor standards will be
given away to foreign countries" as a result of GATT.3 7 In Community terms, the challenge is, therefore, to raise environmental standards throughout the Community so as to combine free trade with
the required level of environmental protection.
The issue of balancing free trade and environmental concerns
arose again in Commission v Belgium.3 8 In that case, the Commission brought proceedings against Belgium regarding a law adopted
by the Walloon region of Belgium which prohibited the storage or
dumping of waste from other countries or from other regions of
Belgium, namely Flanders and Brussels. Although the Walloon region complained that it was becoming the "dustbin of Europe," the
Commission considered the law contrary to two Council Directives
on waste, 39 as well as to Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty. In defense of the regional measure, the Belgian Government argued that
the law was compatible with emerging principles of waste disposal
reflected in the Basel Convention of 22 March 1989, an international agreement on the control of transboundary movements and
disposal of hazardous wastes. According to the Belgian Government, the Walloon measure was in accordance with both the principle of self-sufficiency in waste disposal and the principle of prox-

33

Id.

"' See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuir Branntwein

("Cassis de Dijon"), 1979 ECR 649, 1979:3 CMLR 494.
"'

Case 302/86, 1988 ECR at 4630.

SO See

Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 ECR 649.

See Nancy Dunne, Fears Over Gattzilla the Trade Monster, Financial Times (Jan
30, 1992).
37

'8

Case C-2/90, Commission v Belgium, 1990 OJ C28:6.

a Council Dir 75/442, 1975 OJ L194:39 (on waste); Council Dir 84/631, 1984 OJ L326:31
(on the supervision and control within the European Community of the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste).
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imity, which provides that waste should be disposed of near the
place of production in order to minimize the transportation of
waste. As Advocate General in this case, I reached the conclusion
that the measure could not be regarded as non-discriminatory and,
therefore, did not fall within the permissible exceptions to Article
30. However, the question is by no means closed. Indeed, the proceedings have been reopened twice already, and the issue clearly
perplexes the ECJ.' °
Environmental organizations also have devoted considerable
attention to international trade in waste. For example, Greenpeace
has been critical of the EC's approach. According to Greenpeace,
the European Community runs the risk of creating, not a Single
European Market, but a "Single European Dump." Inevitably, the
issue will be at the forefront of developments in the coming years.
The second major environmental issue to face the ECJ has
been the constitutional debate in the Community on the legal basis
of environmental measures; the resolution of this issue will determine whether measures can be adopted by majority vote in the
Council rather than by unanimous decision. As noted earlier, Article 130S requires Council unanimity in deciding what action is to
be taken by the Community and in defining those matters on
which decisions may be taken by a qualified majority. However,
Article 100A of the Treaty, introduced by the Single European Act,
permits the Council to act by a qualified majority when adopting
measures for the harmonization of national law "which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market."'" Therefore, debate and, sometimes, litigation' 2 ensue on the
question whether a particular environmental measure can be justified as a harmonization measure under Article 100A, or whether it
should be adopted under Article 130S.
I should add that, if a harmonization measure is adopted by a
qualified majority, then a Member State may, under paragraph 4
of Article 100A, continue to apply national provisions "on grounds
of major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection of
the environment or the working environment . . . .",, However,
"0Of some interest, if not directly relevant, is the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in City of Philadelphiav New Jersey, 437 US 617 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held
that a New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of most solid or liquid waste into the
state violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id at 626-27.
" EEC, Art 100A(1) (as amended by SEA, Art 25).
42 See, for example, Case C-300/89, Commission v Council ("Titanium Dioxide"), 1991
ECR 1-2867.
" EEC, Art 100A,
4.
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there are various safeguards. A Member State applying such provisions must notify the Commission, which must verify that the provisions are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States. Moreover, the Commission or any Member State may bring the matter directly before
the ECJ if it considers that another Member State is making improper use of the powers contained in Article 100A.
The third environmental topic which I mention is the role of
the ECJ in proceedings brought against the Member States under
Article 169 of the Treaty for failure to comply with obligations
arising under environmental directives. There have been many
such cases in recent years, relating to such matters as standards for
bathing 44 and drinking water.4 5 In fact, these cases have been
brought against all the Member States of the Community except
Portugal, which still benefits from transitional provisions. The
cases illustrate that, even where the directives in question have
been adopted unanimously, Member States with both advanced
environmental standards and developed economies have found it
difficult to comply fully with the detailed requirements of the directives. This raises considerable questions about the adjustments
which may be necessary if some of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, which have recently emerged from years of environmental neglect and despoliation, join the Community.
Finally, the next generation of environmental issues in Europe
may well be what I describe as liability issues. In the first place,
this topic relates directly to the Article 169 procedures which I
have just mentioned. The Treaty at present provides no sanctions
for default by Member States. However, the Maastricht Treaty, if
ratified, will empower the ECJ to impose penalties for failing to
comply with its judgments.46
Second, such judgments may provide the basis for damages
claims in the national courts. In a recent case concerning the use of
surface water to produce drinking water, the ECJ appeared to recognize the availability of such claims to anyone whose health might
47
be endangered by infringement of the directive.
Finally, there is the potential liability of the private sector. It
is widely reported that industry and, indeed, financial institutions
increasingly fear the costs which may be imposed by environmen-

" Case C-56/90, Commission v United Kingdom, 1990 ECR 1-2821.
45 Case C-42/89, Re Drinking Water: Commission v Belgium, 1992:1 CMLR 22 (1990).

" Treaty on European Union, Art 171, 31 ILM at 292.'
47 Case C-58/89, Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, 1991 OJ C294:12.
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tal liability provisions currently proposed by the Commission. 48
These proposals would implement the principle stated in Article
130R that the polluter should pay. More broadly, the proposals are
an attempt-no doubt based on the U.S. experience-to stimulate
corporate self-regulation through the development of new liability
regimes. The proposals have also raised the prospect that not only
industrial polluters, but also lending institutions, could be liable
for "clean-up costs." Recent press reports in England, for example,
have noted that banks are being forced to conduct "environmental
audits" in order to avoid joint liability for clean-up costs. The
Times reported that after one U.S. lender foreclosed on a manufacturer in the United States, the court ordered the lender to pay asbestos clean-up costs amounting to nearly $500,000. 49 Such developments may prompt financial institutions in Europe to review
their lending policies and, ultimately, may stimulate environmental improvement.
III. THE ROLE OF THE

COURT

In conclusion, I shall be rash enough to venture some thoughts
about the future of the ECJ in the European Community system.
The basic structure of the Community's judicial system has been
modified only once since the origin of the Community. In 1989, the
Court of First Instance was created to hear certain types of cases,
subject to an appeal on a point of law to the ECJ.50 The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance is presently confined to competition cases, cases brought by officials of the Community, and certain coal and steel cases.5 ' Hopefully, the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance will be progressively enlarged. The ECJ itself has
already put forward proposals to that effect, and further developments are envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, it
seems likely that for some time all cases referred from national
courts for rulings on questions of Community law, cases which in
the past have given rise to some of the most significant developments in the Community legal system, will continue to be heard by
the ECJ alone. How the ECJ will be able to cope with the likely

See 1989 OJ C251:3, as amended by 1991 OJ C192:6.
" Neil Bennett, Clean-Up Costs Force Banks to Rethink Lending, Times, Business
Section, 19 (Jan 14, 1992). See also United States v Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F2d 1550,
1557-78 (11th Cir 1990).
00 1988 OJ L319:1.
See Timothy Millett, The Court of First Instance of the European Communities
(Butterworths, 1990).
"
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increase in the number of references is a subject in need of urgent
debate.
I would like to offer one suggestion in a different direction, a
suggestion which may surprise those familiar with the workings of
the ECJ much more than it would surprise U.S. lawyers. It seems
to me that thought might be given, on a limited basis initially, to
allowing some form of amicus curiae brief in certain types of cases
before the ECJ. Although commonplace in the U.S., the amicus
brief is rare in Europe, and in the context of the ECJ may seem
unnecessary, for two reasons. First, there is already often a plethora of parties before the ECJ. Second, some suggest that the European Commission or the Advocate General or both already perform
the function of amicus curiae.
In response to the first point, there is admittedly often some
overcrowding at the Bar. In an Article 177 case, the parties in the
national court appear, as well as the Commission, the Council, and,
occasionally, even the European Parliament. Furthermore, the
Member States also have the right, which they frequently exercise,
to take part. However, rather than providing disinterested advice
to the ECJ, the Member States very often are seeking to defend a
particular interest.
Nor is there really any functional equivalent to the amicus in
the present system. The Commission, of course, is a party in most
direct actions before the ECJ. Even in Article 177 proceedings,
where it comes closest to fulfilling the role of an amicus, the Commission may often have to defend a particular position on the validity of Community measures at issue. Moreover, I suspect that
the Commission's own perception of its role may have changed. In
the 1970s, at a time of political vacuum, the Commission may well
have seen an important part of its task as guiding the ECJ in the
development of the case law, which at that time was the only real
area of development. With the increased political responsibilities
that have followed from the Single European Act, the Commission's responsibilities understandably have become more divided.
Nor can the Advocate General be regarded as an amicus. The
Advocate General delivers an Opinion after the parties have
presented their arguments, and that Opinion may guide both the
ECJ's holding and the development of the law. Also, by virtue of
being included in the ECJ's published opinions, the Advocate General's opinion may be instructive in other, related cases. But, precisely because of this privileged position in presenting views to the
ECJ after the close of the hearing, the Advocate General is unable
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to introduce wholly new material on which the parties have not
had the opportunity to comment.
The process could be facilitated if the ECJ had the power (as
English courts in some circumstances do) to seek, either on its own
motion or at the suggestion of a party or an interested organization, advice from some informed body which does not have a direct
interest in the proceedings. Such advice would be particularly useful in areas such as the environment or in certain aspects of competition or commercial policy law, where the ECJ does not have as
full a picture of the issues as may be desirable. As the fields of
activity of the Community develop, the ECJ will find it increasingly difficult to feel fully competent in the absence of such disinterested guidance.
I turn, finally, to some broader issues about the role of the
European Court of Justice, if only to ask some basic questions.
Frequently, the ECJ is considered to have largely determined the
way in which the European Community developed, at least in the
early stages of the Community. At a time when there was a political vacuum and the legislature was at least partially paralysed, the
ECJ attempted to fill the void by developing constitution-like doctrines that gave the Treaty effective force in the Member States,
despite the absence of either Community or national measures of
implementation. Some would even say, with Federico Mancini,
that the ECJ "sought to 'constitutionalize' the Treaty, to fashion a
constitutional framework for a quasi-federal structure in Europe." 52 That approach by the ECJ has been regarded by some as a
political role. I myself would reject that criticism, which I think
comes from those who are largely unfamiliar with the type of judicial function that the treaties confer on the ECJ. The ECJ's function is, in some respects, essentially constitutional, since the ECJ is
required to adjudicate disputes between institutions as well as between Member States and is required to review the legality of both
Member State and institutional measures.
The question remains, however, whether the ECJ will continue
this activist role in a system where the legislative machinery functions normally and the Community institutions are capable of
making political decisions. It seems to me that, in this new situation, the role of the ECJ may be different but no less significant:

G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, in Robert 0. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, eds, The New European Community 178 (Westview Press,
1991).
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the greater the Community's powers, the more important it is that
such powers be exercised in accordance with the rule of law.
The ECJ has proved very effective in reviewing measures of
the Community institutions and perhaps even more effective in reviewing measures taken by the Member States. Given the relatively weak center, review of Member State action may have
proved more important than review of the institutions. One is irresistibly reminded of the remark of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who
said that he did not think the United States would have come to
an end if the Supreme Court lost its power to declare an Act of
Congress void, but that the Union would be imperilled if the Court
could not declare the laws of the several States void. s
The logical question, then, is whether the ECJ's role may
change in that respect. As powers are increasingly transferred to
the center-and here, at last, the analogy with a federal system
may begin to come into its own-will the emphasis of the ECJ's
role also shift? Will the ECJ's function become that of protecting
the rights of the Member States against alleged encroachments by
the Community Institutions?
And finally, what kind of Community will the ECJ help to
fashion? Will it be a liberal, outward-looking Community, or will it
be, as some fear, an inward-looking protectionist bloc? Ultimately,
the primary responsibility on such matters lies with the political
institutions, but a court, required to ensure the observance of the
law in the application of the Treaty and entrusted with wide powers of review, cannot fail to have some impact also on issues of
economic and commercial policy. Although we cannot be certain of
the ECJ's direction, recent decisions of the ECJ in the field of
commercial policy measures suggest that it is prepared to subject
54
Community action in international trade to proper scrutiny.

" Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Law and the Courts, in Collected Legal Papers 295-6
(Peter Smith, 1952).
11 See Marc Maresceau, ed, The European Community's Commercial Policy After
1992: The Legal Dimension (Nijhoff, forthcoming).

